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holding, the court noted that a lien represents an integral part of the
lienor's interest even though a lien is not property within the meaning
of CPLR 5201(b).18 On the sale of the debt by the sheriff, the purchaser is therefore entitled to possession of the scrap metal with the
1
right to sell it if the petitioner fails to satisfy the debt.u
CPLR 5222: Restraining notice is not cancelled by ex parte stay of
execution.
A CPLR 5222 restraining notice allows a judgment creditor
to prevent his debtor or a third party from disposing of the debtor's
assets before execution.13 5 A third party who disposes of a judgment
debtor's assets in violation of a restraining notice is subject to contempt
sanctions and liable to the creditor for damages. 38 Third parties, therefore, should not assume that a restraining notice has ceased to be
effective. This point was illustrated in Nardone v. Long Island Trust
1 7

C0. 8

In Nardone, a judgment creditor served a restraining notice on a
bank pursuant to CPLR 5222. The judgment debtor moved to open
the default judgment and obtained an ex parte order staying execution.
The bank informally received a copy of this order and permitted the
debtor to write checks against his account. When the sheriff attempted
to execute the judgment, the account was overdrawn. The creditor
sued the bank for damages for violating the restraining notice. Unanimously reversing a judgment for the respondent and granting the
petitioner's motion for summary judgment, the Appellate Division,
133 71 Misc. 2d at 1018, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 782, citing Merritt v. Bartholick, 36 N.Y. 44
(1867); Beak v. Waits, 266 App. Div. 900, 42 N.Y.S.2d 652 (4th Dep't 1943) (mem.).
There is support, however, for the proposition that a lien itself is property.
[A] lien is property in the broad sense of that word, and although it has no
physical existence it exists by operation of law so effectively as to have pecuniary
value, and to be capable of being bought and sold.
Haebler v. Myers, 132 N.Y. 363, 368, 30 N.E. 963, 965 (1892). See also Yarmak v. Perry, 182
Misc. 268, 43 N.Y.S.2d 304 (N.Y. City Ct. N.Y. County 1943).
134 "At any time during this procedure, [the lienee] may redeem its property by
paying to the sheriff the amount of the artisan's lien." 71 Misc. 2d at 1019, 337 N.Y.S.2d at
782-83. By requiring the purchaser to sell the property to satisfy the lien, the lienee is
afforded the protections of article 9 of the Lien Law, including notice of sale and the right
of redemption.
135 See 6 WK&M
5222.01.
136 CPLR 5251 expressly provides for contempt sanctions against violators of CPLR
5222. Without express statutory authority, courts have held that the remedy of damages is
also available. See Mazzuka v. Bank of North America, 53 Misc. 2d 1053, 280 N.Y.S.2d 495
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1967), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JOHN's L.
Rlv. 436, 466 (1968). See also Sumitomo Shoji New York, Inc. v. Chemical Bank New York
Trust Co., 47 Misc. 2d 741, 263 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965), af'ed mem., 25
App. Div. 2d 499, 267 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1st Dep't 1966) (dictum), discussed in The Biannual
Survey, 40 ST.JonN's L. REv. 303, 348 (1966).
.37 40 App. Div. 2d 697, 336 N.Y.S.2d 325 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.).
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Second Department, held that the ex parte stay did not suspend the
effectiveness of the restraining notice but merely prevented the creditor from executing the judgment. A hearing was ordered on damages,
which were limited to the amount in the account at the time of the
service of the restraining notice plus costs.388
Since the judgment creditor in Nardone was not secured in any
way,189 the court's decision seems justified. As the court noted' 4 0 a
contrary holding would provide judgment debtors with a simple
means of freeing assets from restraint, thus frustrating the intent of
CPLR 5222.
CPLR 5240: Protectingthe judgment debtor from abuses of execution
and forced sales.
Pursuant to CPLR 5240, courts have broad discretionary powers
to deny, modify, or limit the use of any enforcement procedure.' 4'
Recently, the Supreme Court, Nassau County, applied this provision
in two cases to protect recipients of public assistance who were in
danger of losing their homes as a result of execution and forced sales.
In Hammond v. Econo-Car of the North Shore, Inc.,14 a creditor
of a husband executed against his interest in the family home. Because the creditor had not shown to the court's satisfaction that it had
tried to collect the $1400 debt from the delinquent husband first, and
because those to suffer most from execution would be the estranged
wife and children who were living in the home and being assisted by
public funds, the court restrained enforcement of the judgment. 14 The
court emphasized that the harassment effect of enforcement outweighed
"any substantive value in immediate occupancy rights to anyone out138 Id., 336 N.YS.2d at 827.
189 When a judgment is appealed, the judgment debtor may obtain an automatic
stay of execution by filing an undertaking as security pursuant to CPLR 5519. Authorities
contend that an automatic stay granted under CPLR 5519 suspends the effectiveness of a
restraining notice. See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5222, commentary at 79 (1963); 6 WKM

5222.03. Their rationale is that the judgment creditor is adequately protected by the
debtor's undertaking. In Nardone, the judgment debtor was not appealing a judgment but
w.as seeking to open one. Therefore, there was no requirement that an undertaking be
filed.
140 40 App. Div. 2d at 697, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 327.
141
See Dime Savings Bank v. Barnes, 67 Misc. 2d 837, 325 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1971) (mem.), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JoHN's L. REv.768,

791 (1972); 7B McKINNY's CPLR 5240, commentary at 203 (1963); 6 WK&-M

5240.01. Cf.

CPLR 3103.
142 71 Misc. 2d 546, 336 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (mem.).
143 The court cited Gilchrist v. Commercial Credit Corp., 66 Misc. 2d 791, 822
N.Y.S.2d 200 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST.
JOHN's L. REv. 355, 378 (1971), which paralleled the facts in this case and in which the

court emphasized the risk to the children of the loss of their home if the wife predeceased the husband.

